Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position | Legal Boundaries and Regulatory Compliance

Prohibition of abuse of dominant position is a legal framework designed to prevent entities that hold a dominant market position from engaging in practices that could harm competitive conditions in the market, consumer interests, or economic freedom of other companies. This prohibition is a cornerstone of antitrust laws globally and is aimed at ensuring a level playing field in the marketplace.
Entities are considered dominant if they have significant market power that allows them to act independently of competitors, customers, or ultimately, consumers. The abuse can take various forms, such as imposing unfair purchase or selling prices, limiting production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers, or applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, thereby placing certain partners at a competitive disadvantage.

Table of Contents

1. Dominant position itself is not prohibited
2. Meaning of Dominant Position
3. Unfair or discretionary conditions or prices in purchase/sale is abuse of dominant position
4. Limiting or restricting production or development
5. Denial of market access is abuse of dominant position
6. Supplementary obligations unconnected to main contract is abuse of dominant position
7. Using dominant position to enter another market is abuse of dominant position
8. CCI can order division of enterprise enjoying dominant position

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1. Dominant position itself is not prohibited

No enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position. [Section 4(1) of Competition Act].

Definitions of ‘enterprise’ and ‘group’ have been discussed in earlier chapter of this book.

Note that ‘dominant position’ itself is not prohibited. For example, if over 90% of customers prefer Windows for computers, that is not fault of Microsoft.

If most of people use Google search engine, they cannot be stopped from doing so. That is choice of customers. CCI cannot order that Google should not cater to more than 50% of market of search engine.

Mere fact that the party is a dominant enterprise in the relevant market is not a violation of Competition Act. Its abuse is the violation of the Act – PDA Trade Fairs v. Indian Trade Promotion Organisation (2012) 116 SCL 357 = 27 taxmann.com 218 (CCI).

Abuse of dominant position is prohibited – What is prohibited is its misuse. The abuse can be by an enterprise or ‘group’.

Act is not a penal Act, as action specified in section 4 by itself is not offence – Competition Act is not a penal Act as it does not make punishable by itself an act of entering into an agreement, contrary to provisions of Act. Breach of sections 3 and 4 of Competition Act by itself is not an offence and, therefore, entering into an agreement, contrary to provisions of law, is not an offence but such agreement is only void that may not be enforceable in law. Even if parties enter into an agreement covered by Act that by itself, does not amount to an offence. What is made punishable is disobedience of order passed by Commission and its non-compliance – Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. CCI (2011) 108 SCL 621 = 12 taxmann.com 285 (Bom HC DB).

Government company is not exempted from purview of Competition Act – A State monopoly is not excluded from provisions of Competition Act. Government company is not exempted from purview of Competition Act – Coal India v. CCI (2023) 151 taxmann.com 235 = 179 SCL 159 (SC 3 members).

Provision applies even where agreement was entered prior to date when section 4 was made effective – Section 4 of the Act came into effect on 20-5-2009. In Belaire Owners Association v. DLF Ltd. (2011) 109 SCL 655 = 14 taxmann.com 90 (CCI), it has been held that provisions of section 4 would apply even where agreement was entered prior to 20-5-2009.

1.1 One sided contracts where bargaining power of parties is inequal are against public policy and are void

Section 23 of Contract Act states that consideration or object of an agreement is not lawful if Court regards it as opposed to public policy. If Court holds a consideration or object as against public policy, such agreement will be void as unlawful.

In case of enterprise or group in dominant position, it is in a commanding position and they can virtually dictate the terms of agreement and the other party has no option but to accept the terms and conditions.

These are termed as ‘dotted line’ agreements as the other party has just to sign on dotted line.

The approach of enterprise or group in dominant position is simply ‘take it or leave it’.

Such one sided contracts are against public policy and have been held as void.

The aggrieved person can approach Courts for relief in case of such one sided contracts.

Adhesion contracts – If the contracting parties do not have equal bargaining power, contracts are often one sided. Such contracts are ‘Adhesion Contracts’. These are standardised form of contract form offered on essentially ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording other party realistic opportunity to bargain. The weaker party has no realistic choice as to terms. One party is in a position to dominate other and there is inequality of bargaining power. Court can grant relief if clauses in such contract are so unreasonable as to be unconscionable – Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156 = (1986) 3 Comp LJ 1 = 60 Comp Cas 797 = AIR 1986 SC 1571 [In this case, it was held that clause of removal from service by three months’ notice is wholly unreasonable and against public policy]. – Quoted and followed in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725.

Standard format of contracts void if absurd – In Pawan Alloys v. UPSEB AIR 1997 SC 3910 = 1997 AIR SCW 3839 = (1997) 7 SCC 251 also, Supreme Court, quoting from various authorities, held that if the party signs an agreement with onerous condition as he has no option, it cannot be said that he has accepted the term willingly. No businessman in his senses would ever agree voluntarily to an absurd, incongruous and inconsistent condition. In this case, it was held that the appellant had only undergone the formality of signing standard form of contract. They had not voluntarily or by even remotest chance agreed to give up the benefit (by signing the standard form of agreement).

Unjust conditions in contract are against public policy – In Hindustan Times v. State of UP 2002 AIR SCW 4706, it was observed, ‘State cannot resort to theory of ‘take it or leave it’. The bargaining power of the State and subject (newspapers in this case) is unequal. Any unjust condition thrust upon them by the State would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also section 23 of Indian Contract Act.

Inequal one sided dotted line contracts are void – In LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre AIR 1995 SC 1811 = (1995) 84 Comp. Cas. 168 (SC) = (1995) 5 SCC 482 = 1995 AIR SCW 2834, the Apex Court has come down heavily on such one sided contracts. It was held that an unfair and untenable or irrational clause in a contract is amenable to judicial review. In common law, a party was relieved from such a contract. This will also apply to ‘standard form of contract’ where there was inequality of bargaining power. If a contract is found unreasonable or unfair or irrational, one must look into relative bargaining power of the contracting parties. In ‘dotted line’ contracts, there would be no occasion to a weaker party to bargain. He has to accept the unreasonable or unfair terms or forego the service. There is no equal bargaining power, as the approach of authority is ‘take it or leave it’.

2. Meaning of Dominant Position

“Dominant position” means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India, which enables it to:

• operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or
• affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour. [Explanation (a) to section 4 of Competition Act].

If the TV programme viewership is not very high, it cannot be said to be in ‘dominant position’ and hence complaint against such TV programme (Kaun Banega Crorepati – KBC – in this case) is not maintainable – Anuj Kumar Bhari v. Sony Entertainment TV (2011) 110 SCL 2 = 14 taxmann.com 170 (Del HC).

In Surinder Bhakoo v. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2011) 110 SCL 17 = 14 taxmann.com 63 (CCI), it was found that the Bank is not in dominant position in housing finance loan and hence it was held that the complaint is not maintainable.

In Arshiya Rail Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ministry of Railways (2012) 116 SCL 417 = 27 taxmann.com 25 (CCI), it has been held that in transportation of containers within India, railways are not having dominant position as major transportation is by road.

2.1 Relevant Market

“Relevant market” means the market which may be determined by the commission with reference to the relevant product market or the relevant geographic market or with reference to both the markets. [Section 2(r) of Competition Act].

Relevant geographic market – “Relevant geographic market” means a market comprising the area in which the conditions of competition for supply of goods or provision of services or demand of goods or services are distinctly homogenous and can be distinguished from the conditions prevailing in the neighbouring areas. [Section 2(s) of Competition Act].

Relevant product market – “Relevant product market” means a market comprising of all those products or services:

• which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of characteristics of the products or services, their prices and intended use; or
• the production or supply of, which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the supplier, by reason of the ease of switching production between such products and services and marketing them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices [section 2(t) of Competition Act, substituted vide Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 from 18-5-2023].

Earlier definition – “Relevant product market” means a market comprising all those products or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of characteristics of the products or services, their prices and intended use. [Section 2(t) of Competition Act as existing upto 18-5-2023].

2.2 Factors to be considered while deciding whether enterprise enjoys dominant position

The Commission shall, while inquiring whether an enterprise enjoys a dominant position or not under section 4 of Competition Act, have due regard to all or any of the following factors –

• market share of the enterprise.
• size and resources of the enterprise.
• size and importance of the competitors.
• economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors.
• vertical integration of the enterprises or sale or service network of such enterprises.
• dependence of consumers on the enterprise.
• monopoly or dominant position whether acquired as a result of any statute or by virtue of being a Government company or a public sector undertaking or otherwise.
• entry barriers including barriers such as regulatory barriers, financial risk, high capital cost of entry, marketing entry barriers, technical entry barriers, economies of scale, high cost of substitutable goods or service for consumers.
• countervailing buying power.
• market structure and size of market.
• social obligations and social costs.
• relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by the enterprise enjoying a dominant position having or likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition.
• any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant for the inquiry [section 19(4) of Competition Act].

For determining whether a market constitutes a “relevant market” for the purposes of the Competition Act, the Commission shall have due regard to the “relevant geographic market” and “relevant product market”. [Section 19(5) of Competition Act].

Relevant geographic market – The Commission shall, while determining the “relevant geographic market”, have due regard to all or any of the following factors:

• Regulatory trade barriers.
• Local specification requirements.
• National procurement policies.
• Adequate distribution facilities.
• Transport costs.
• Language.
• Consumer preferences.
• Need for secure or, regular supplies or rapid after-sales services.
• Characteristics of goods or nature of services.
• Costs associated with switching supply or demand to other areas. [Section 19(6) of Competition Act].

Relevant Product Market – The Commission shall, while determining the “relevant product market”, have due regard to all or any of the following factors:

• physical characteristics or end-use of goods or the nature of services
• price of goods or service
• consumer preferences
• exclusion of in-house production
• existence of specialised producers
• classification of industrial products
• costs associated with switching demand or supply to other goods or service
• categories of customers [section 19(7) of Competition Act – The words in italics, inserted vide Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 from 18-5-2023].

Market leader in particular area can be dominant in relevant market – In Belaire Owners Association v. DLF Ltd. (2011) 109 SCL 655 = 14 taxmann.com 90 (CCI), DLF was market leader in high end residential accommodation in Gurgaon. It was market leader in real estate sector in general and in relevant market in particular. It was held that DLF has dominance in ‘relevant market’ – Followed in Magnolia Flat Owners Association v. DLF Universal Ltd. (2012) 112 SCL 538 = 19 taxmann.com 278 (CCI). [That way, the scope can be limited to any extent. Can we say that a shopkeeper has ‘dominant position’ in ‘Lane No. 3’ as that is the only shop in that lane?]

2.3 What is ‘abuse of dominant position’

Section 4(2) of Competition Act states that there shall be an abuse of dominant position under section 4(1) of Competition Act, if an enterprise or ‘group’ follows any of the practices specified in section 4(2) of Competition Act.

Note that these are defined as ‘abuse’, i.e. these are prohibited. If any of the following practice is followed, it is ‘abuse’, and no further proof of any damage or loss is required.

The actions which are defined as ‘abuse of dominant position’ are discussed below.

3. Unfair or discretionary conditions or prices in purchase/sale is abuse of dominant position

Directly or indirectly, imposing unfair or discriminatory:

• condition in purchase or sale of goods or services; or
• price in purchase or sale (including predatory price) of goods or service is abuse of dominant position. [Section 4(2)(a) of Competition Act].

Action not abuse if adopted to meet competition – As per Explanation to section 4(2)(a) of Competition Act, the unfair or discriminatory condition in purchase or sale of goods or services and unfair or discriminatory price in purchase or sale of goods (including predatory price) or service shall not include such condition or price [The earlier words were – discriminatory condition or price] which may be adopted to meet the competition [section 4(2)(a) of Competition Act amended vide Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 from 18-5-2023].

Thus, if such practices are adopted to meet competition, it will not be abuse of dominant power.

One sided agreement and changing terms of offer midway is abuse of dominant position – In Belaire Owners Association v. DLF Ltd. (2011) 109 SCL 655 = 14 taxmann.com 90 (CCI), DLF was market leader in high end residential accommodation in Gurgaon. It had dominance in ‘relevant market’. It was market leader in real estate sector in general and in relevant market in particular. DLF had entered into contract with allottees of flats in group housing complex ‘The Belaire’. DLF had added many floors to those announced earlier. Number of apartments were increased by 53%, without obtaining views of earlier customers. DLF had put one sided unfair conditions with the allottees who had become ‘captive consumers’. DLF was ordered to remove such unfair conditions in the agreements. Penalty of 7% of turnover (Rs. 630 crores) was imposed on DLF – the decision was confirmed in DLF Ltd. v. CCI (2014) 145 taxmann.com 300 = 127 SCL 68 (CAT) followed in Magnolia Flat Owners Association v. DLF Universal Ltd. (2012) 112 SCL 538 = 19 taxmann.com 278 (CCI).

Similar order about abuse of dominant position has been passed in Ashutosh Bhardwaj v. DLF Ltd. (2017) 139 SCL 381 = 77 taxmann.com 292 (CCI).

The decision in case of Belaire Owners Association has been confirmed in DLF Ltd. v. CCI (2014) 127 SCL 68 = 45 taxmann.com 300 (CAT).

3.1 Predatory Price

Predatory pricing is abuse of dominant position under section 4(2)(a) of Competition Act.

Predatory means ‘naturally preying on others’ – like jungle animals. This term is used to indicate persons who are out to kill competition by fair or foul means.

Predatory pricing means pricing below cost to eliminate competitor.

“Predatory price” means the sale of goods or provision of services, at a price which is below the cost, as may be determined by regulations, of production of the goods or provision of services, with a view to reduce competition or eliminate the competitors. [Explanation (b) to section 4(2) of Competition Act].

Determining cost of production – During proceedings before CCI, it may be necessary to determine cost of production of a product within meaning of Explanation to section 4 of Competition Act. This should be determined as per CCI (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2009.

‘Cost’ shall be taken as average variable cost, as a proxy for marginal cost.

‘Average variable cost’ means total variable cost divided by total output during referred period [Regulation 2(b) of CCI (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2009].

CCI can consider other relevant concept such as avoidable cost, long run average incremental cost, market value etc. In arriving at figures of costs, CCU/DG may take help of suitable experts [Regulation 3(2) of CCI (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2009].

Giving heavy discounts to drivers to exclude other market players – In Uber India v. CCI (2019) 156 SCL 141 = 109 taxmann.com 84 (SC), Uber was offering discounts/incentives to its drivers to keep them attached on its network to the exclusion of other market players. Uber was losing Rs. 204 per trip. It was held that Uber is misusing its dominant position.

Giving cross subsidy to protect another market is predatory pricing – In MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) (2011) 109 SCL 222 = 13 taxmann.com 110 (CCI), NSE had used its dominant position in non-CD (i.e. other than Currency Derivatives) segment (where NSE had virtual monopoly) to protect its position in CD (Currency Derivatives) section by cross subsidising this segment of business from other segments where NSE had virtual monopoly. It had waived transaction fee and admission fee for memberships in CD market. It was held by CCI that this is predatory pricing. It was also held that there was clear intention of NSE to eliminate competitors in relevant market. A penalty of Rs. 55.5 crores (5% of turnover) was imposed on NSE. – – – The order has been confirmed in National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India (2014) 128 SCL 236 = 48 taxmann.com 100 (CAT).

Mala fide intention is required to be shown even if price below cost – In Modern Food Industries In re – (1996) 4 CTJ 81 (MRTPC), it was held that it requires to be established that the pricing below cost was with intention to drive competitor out of business or to eliminate competition. Mere offer of price lower than cost of production cannot automatically lead to an indictment of predatory pricing. – Followed in Britannia Industries Ltd. In re (1997) 24 CLA 136 (MRTPC), where it was held that charge of predatory pricing cannot be sustained on basis of cost of production of one month. Further, presence of mala fide intention is necessary to hold charge of predatory pricing.

Price reduction and then huge price rise after eliminating completion – In DGIR v. Seraikella Glass Works (1999) 33 CLA 225 (MRTPC), it was held that mala fide intention on part of the charged party to drive its competitors out of business or to eliminate competition has to be established. In this case, it was found that prices were drastically lowered and when competitor’s businesses closed down, prices were jacked up after ouster of competitors. It was held that allegation of predatory pricing is proved. Cease and desist order was issued.

4. Limiting or restricting production or development

Limiting or restricting (i) production of goods or provision of services or market therefor; or (ii) technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice of consumers, is abuse of dominant position [section 4(2)(b) of Competition Act].

5. Denial of market access is abuse of dominant position

Indulging in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access in any manner, is abuse of dominant position [section 4(2)(c) of Competition Act].

Denial to broadcaster of market access – In CCI v. Fast Way Transmission P. Ltd. (2018) 4 SCC 316 = 92 taxmann.com 243 = 147 SCL 198 (SC), Cable Operators’ group, which was in dominant position, prematurely terminated agreement with broadcaster of a TV Channel, resulting in denial to broadcaster of market access. It was held that this action is violative of section 4(2)(c) of Competition Act [However, penalty was waived as reason for termination of agreement mid-stream was found to be justifiable].

BCCI blocking entry of competitive league cricket matches is abuse of dominant position by BCCI – In Surinder Singh Barmi v. Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) (2013) 118 SCL 226 = 31 taxmann.com 61 (CCI), it was held that BCCI used its dominant position by explicitly agreeing not to sanction any competitive league during currency of IPL media rights agreement. A penalty of Rs. 52.24 crores (6% of average gross turnover) was imposed.

In Pan India Infraprojects P. Ltd. v. BCCI (2018) 94 taxmann.com 50 = 148 SCL 520 (CCI), it was found that BCCI was holding dominant position in relevant market for organisation of private professional league cricket in India. It had abused its dominant position by restraining informant from organizing competitive league i.e. ICL and blacklisted informant. It was held that this is abuse of dominant position by BCCI.

ICAI’s non-outsourcing of CPE seminars that are eligible for CPE credits doesn’t indicate abuse of dominance – Members of CA Institute are required to attend Continuous Education Programmes for minimum specified hours in a year. Such programmes can be organized and conducted only by CA Institute and their branches.Other organisations are not allowed to conduct programmes which are eligible for CPE Hours.

In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) v. Competition Commission of India [2023] 151 taxmann.com 32 (Delhi HC), this restriction has been upheld. It has been held that ICAI is not guilty of abuse of dominance for not outsourcing holding of CPE seminars eligible for CPE credits. There is a relevant market “for organising recognised CP Seminars/Workshops/Conferences”, as ICAI is statutory body and fulfilling its statutory obligations.

Regulatory intervention without evident anti-competitive practice hampers autonomy of enterprise, trade should be free to take decision on basis of commercial considerations – Commercial wisdom of exhibitors to exhibit a particular film is largely governed by consumer demand and unless harm to competition is apparent, any intervention will only lead to undesirable consequence by taking away autonomy of such undertaking and substituting decision of such entity by decision of CCI. Decision to exhibit particular movie is commercial decision and CCI cannot interfere. Regulatory intervention without evident anti-competitive practice hampers autonomy of enterprise – Yogesh Pratap Singh v. PVR Ltd. [2024] 158 taxmann.com 138 (CCI). [a good and practical view indeed. Trade should have sufficient freedom to take decisions on basis of commercial considerations]

6. Supplementary obligations unconnected to main contract is abuse of dominant position

Making conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject to such contracts, is abuse of dominant position. [Section 4(2)(d) of Competition Act].

7. Using dominant position to enter another market is abuse of dominant position

Using dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, other relevant market is abuse of dominant position [section 4(2)(e) of Competition Act].

For example, Microsoft used its dominant position in Disk Operating System (DOS) to dominate browser market and ruined Netscape.

Google fined Rs. 1337.76 crores for using dominant position in multiple markets – Google has been fined Rs. 1337.76 crores by CCI for using dominant position in multiple markets in the Android mobile devise ecosystem. Google indulged in mandatory pre-installation of certain products and perpetuated its dominant position in the online search market. Google secured and embedded for itself through Mobile Application distribution Agreement (MADA). Its Revenue Sharing Agreement (RSAs) helped Google to secure exclusivity for its search engine. With these agreements, competitors had no chance to compete with Google – CCI Press Release No. 55/2022-23 dated 21-10-2022.

This case has not been reported on website of CCI, possibly because the party might have requested confidentiality.

Appeal against the order by Google LLC was admitted by NCLAT on condition of deposit of 10% penalty amount – Google LLC v. CCI (2023) 146 taxmann.com 112 (NCLAT). Order of NCLAT of pre-deposit of 10% of penalty was affirmed in Google LLC v. CCI (2023) 176 SCL 441 = 146 taxmann.com 380 (SC).

The penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crores has been confirmed in Google LLC v.Competition Commission of India [2023] 148 taxmann.com 458 (NCLAT). However, some directions issued by CCI have been set aside.

CCI imposes penalty of Rs. 936.44 Cr. on Google for abuse of dominance in market for licensable OS for smartphones & in market for app store for Android – Google is held to be dominant in two relevant markets i.e., market for licensable OS for smart mobile devices in India and market for app store for Android smart mobile OS in India by CCI.

Google made access to the Play Store, for app developers, dependent on mandatory usage of GPBS (Google Play Billing System) for paid apps and in-app purchases, which constitutes an imposition of unfair condition on app developers. It follows discriminatory practices by not using GPBS for its own applications i.e., YouTube. YouTube is not paying the service fee as being imposed on other apps covered in the GPBS requirements.

Mandatory imposition of GPBS disturbs innovation incentives and the ability of both the payment processors as well as app developers to undertake technical development and innovate and thus, tantamount to limiting technical development in the market for in-app payment processing services. Different methodologies used by Google to integrate its own UPI app vis-à-vis other rival UPI apps with the Play Store results in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(ii), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act.

The prohibitions laid down in section 4 the Act are straight forward and any abuse of dominant position in terms of imposition of unfair conditions, denial of market access, leveraging, imposition for supplementary obligations etc., is prohibited. Accordingly, in terms of the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, the Commission directed Google to cease and desist from indulging in anti-competitive practices and a penalty of Rs. 936.44 crore has been imposed upon Google for violating Section 4 of the Act. The amount is 7% of relevant turnover (average of last three financial years) – XYZ (Confidential) v. Alphabet Inc., Google LLC and Others [2022] 145 taxmann.com 43 (CCI).

Google making pre-installation of Google Play Store mandatory is abuse of dominant position – In Kshitij Arya v. Google LLC (2021) 127 taxmann.com 779 (CCI), Google had made pre-installation of its proprietary apps (particularly Google Play Store) mandatory for all android devises manufactured, distributed or marketed by device manufacturers. It was held that this is abuse of dominant position.

8. CCI can order division of enterprise enjoying dominant posi- tion

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) may direct division of an enterprise enjoying dominant position to ensure that such enterprise does not abuse its dominant position. [Section 28(1) of Competition Act].

Order of division passed under section 28(1) of Competition Act may provide for all or any of the following matters –

• the transfer or vesting of property, rights, liabilities or obligations.
• the adjustment of contracts either by discharge or reduction of any liability or obligation or otherwise.
• the creation, allotment, surrender or cancellation of any shares, stocks or securities.
• (Omitted).
• the formation or winding up of an enterprise or the amendment of the memorandum of association or articles of association or any other instruments regulating the business of any enterprise.
• the extent to which, and the circumstances in which, provisions of the order affecting an enterprise may be altered by the enterprise and the registration thereof.
• any other matter which may be necessary to give effect to the division of the enterprise. [Section 28(2) of Competition Act].

8.1 No compensation to any officer of company if there is division of enterprise

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract or in any memorandum or articles of association, an officer of a company who ceases to hold office as such in consequence of the division of an enterprise shall not be entitled to claim any compensation for such cesser. [Section 28(3) of Competition Act].