Circular No. 17 /2024, dated 18-11-2024

Section 115BAA and 115BAB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides for special regimes of taxation for Companies. However, the respective sections provide that the beneficial provisions are applicable only if the option is exercised in Form 10-IC and Form 10-ID, respectively, on or before the due date specified under section 139(1) for furnishing the returns of income.

For Assessment Years 2020-21 and 2021-22, circulars were issued to condone the delay in furnishing forms 10-IC/10-ID. The CBDT has received various representations stating that Form No. 10-IC or Form No. 10-ID could not be filed for various assessment years on or before the due date or extended due date.

Addressing the genuine hardship caused to assessees in exercising the option, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has issued a circular to condone the delay in furnishing the forms for AY 2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23.

The CBDT has authorised officers to handle applications for condoning delays in filing Forms 10-IC or 10-ID for Assessment Years 2020-21, 2021-22, and 2022-23.

It has been clarified that Pr. Commissioners of Income Tax (Pr. CslT’)/ Commissioners of Income Tax (‘CsIT’) to admit and deal with the applications for condonation of delay in filing of Form No. 10-IC or Form No. 10-ID for Assessment Years 2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23 where there is a delay of up to 365 days. However, the Pr. Chief Commissioners of Income Tax (Pr. CCsIT’)/ Chief Commissioners of Income Tax (‘CCsIT’)/Directors General of Income Tax (‘DsGIT’) to admit and deal with the applications for condonation of delay where there is a delay of more than 365 days.

Further, The Pr. CCsIT/CCsIT/ DsGIT/Pr. CsIT/ CsIT shall ensure that the following conditions are satisfied while deciding such applications:

• The return of income for the relevant assessment year has been filed on or before the due date specified under section 139(1) of the Act;
• The assessee has opted for taxation under section 115BAA in case condonation of delay is for Form No. 10-IC and under section 115BAB in case the condonation of delay is for Form No. 10-ID, in “Filing Status” in “Part A-GEN” of the Form of Return of Income ITR-6; and
• The assessee was prevented by reasonable cause from filing such Form before the expiry of the time allowed, and the case is of genuine hardship on merits.

Click Here To Read The Full Circular

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Circular 16/2024, dated 18-11-2024

The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has issued a circular to deal with the condonation of delay in filing of Form 9A, 10, 10B and 10BB for Assessment Year 2018-19 and subsequent assessment years.

The key highlights of the circular are outlined below:

• The circular authorised Pr. Commissioners of Income Tax (Pr. CITs)/Commissioners of Income Tax (CITs) to condone delays of up to 365 days in filing Forms 9A/10/10B/10BB for AY 2018-19 and later years.
• Delays exceeding 365 days will be handled by the Pr. Chief Commissioners of Income Tax (Pr. CCsIT’)/Chief Commissioners of Income Tax (CCsIT)/Director Generals of Income Tax (DGsIT).

Further, the Pr. CCsIT/CCsITI/Pro CsIT/CsIT, while entertaining such applications for condonation of delay, shall satisfy themselves that the applicant was prevented by reasonable cause from filing such Forms before the expiry of the time allowed and the case is of genuine hardship on merits.

However, it is also clarified no application for condonation of delay shall be entertained beyond three years from the end of the assessment year for which such application is made. The condonation application should be disposed of within six months from the end of the month in which the Competent Authority receives such application.

Click Here To Read The Full Circular

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Case Details: Ravi Agrawal vs. Union of India - [2024] 168 taxmann.com 320 (SC)[20-08-2024]

Judiciary and Counsel Details

• B.V. Nagarathna & Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Facts of the Case

Section 80DD deals with the payment of an annuity of a lump sum amount for the benefit of a dependant, a person with a disability, in the event of death of the individual or the member of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) in whose name the subscription to the scheme stipulated in the said provision has been made. The Parliament amended section 80DD by virtue of the Finance Act 2022, with effect from 1-4-2023. Consequently, on attaining the age of 60 years or more by an individual subscriber or a member of a HUF, the payment or deposit to the scheme envisaged under section 80DD could be discontinued, and the monetary benefit that would have accumulated could be made use of.

The assessee submitted that the amendment ought to be made retrospective as the same was with effect from 1-4-2023 to the existing policies as it would benefit a large number of subscribers who were interested in making use of the benefit of such policies for the benefit of the disabled persons on turning 60 years of age. An option could be reserved for the subscribers to benefit from the amendment regarding policies made much prior to 2014, as in the said year, such policies had been discontinued.

He contended that if the amendments were given a retrospective effect, many subscribers, as well as disabled persons, would benefit, and hence, the concerns of the assessee being purely in the public interest might be considered, and relief might be granted.

Considering the Public Interest involved, the assessee filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as a Public Interest Litigation before the Supreme Court of India.

Supreme Court Held

The Apex Court held that it was difficult to accept the plea made by the assessee to the effect that the amendment made to section 80DD be applied retrospectively to policies that were taken prior to 2014 so that the benefit of the amendment is given to those subscribers also. The whole object of Jeevan Adhar’s Policy was to benefit disabled persons by making provisions for the subscriber after his demise.

The concern and apprehension of a caregiver or subscriber of a policy for a disabled family member or other person for whose benefit the policy is taken after the demise of the caregiver is of utmost significance. It is only with that object that the caregiver or a subscriber would take such a policy so that he would not leave a disabled person in the lurch on his demise.

If that is the object of the policy, then the subscriber or the caregiver of the subscriber should not be given the liberty to discontinue the policy during his lifetime upon attaining 60 years of age. That would only go against the object with which the policy has been taken and against the beneficiary’s interest, namely, a disabled person.

The plea for retrospective operation of the amendment was not in the interest of the disabled persons, nor can this Court give a retrospective operation to the amendment. This was particularly concerning because an insurance contract is, in a sense, a commercial contract, having specific terms and conditions, and the sub-stratum of the contract cannot be removed by giving a retrospective operation to the amendment. The benefit under section 80DD would have been availed by the subscribers when they subscribed to the policy.

Accordingly, the writ petition was disposed of.

The post FA 2022 Amendment Allowing Discontinuation of Section 80DD Deposits Couldn’t Be Applied Retrospectively | SC appeared first on Taxmann Blog.

Case Details: Santoshkumari Darshanlal Chopra vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (IT and TP) - [2024] 168 taxmann.com 277 (Gujarat)

Judiciary and Counsel Details

• Bhargav D. Karia & Mrs. Mauna M. Bhatt, JJ.
• Tushar Hemani, Sr. Adv. & Ms Vaibhavi K. Parikh, Adv. for the Petitioner. 
• Dev Pate & Varun K. Patel, Advs. for the Respondent.

Facts of the Case

The assessee, an individual taxpayer, filed her tax return for the assessment year 2022-23, declaring an income of Rs. 8,80,940 and claiming a Section 54 deduction of Rs. 75,11,280 after selling a residential property. She reinvested Rs. 80,00,000 in a new property, qualifying her for the deduction and a refund of Rs. 28,73,800.

Due to technical issues, the assessee couldn’t e-verify her return within 30 days. Being an 84-year-old non-resident living in New Zealand, she later sent a signed ITR-V to CPC Bengaluru but discovered her return was invalidated due to the missed e-verification. On June 26, 2023, the assessee applied under Section 119(2)(b) to condone the delay, requesting that her return be treated as valid. However, the application filed by the assessee seeking condonation of delay for e-verification of the return of income had been rejected.

High Court Held

On writ, the Gujarat High Court held that the assessee explained the reason for the belated filing of the return in the application under section 119(2)(b). The status of the assessee as a non-resident Individual is not in dispute. Further, there is no denying that the assessee was unavailable in India from 17.06.2020 to 09.08.2022 since the necessary documents were part of the record. The due date for filing the return of income had expired on account of the assessee’s non-availability.

Therefore, she filed a belated income return under section 139(4). It was a case of genuine hardship faced by the assessee, and there being sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The order passed by the AO deserved to be quashed and set aside.

The post Delay in Filing ITR Condoned for 84-Year-Old NRI Due to Technical Issues Preventing E-Verification appeared first on Taxmann Blog.

Case Details: Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS) vs. Tushira Industries - [2024] 168 taxmann.com 169 (Karnataka)

Judiciary and Counsel Details

• Krishna S. Dixit & Vijaykumar A. Patil, JJ.
• M. Thirumalesh & Roopa Anvekar, Advs. for the Appellant.
• C.M. Chandrashekar, Senior Counsel, J.M. Anil Kumar, Adv. & V.S. Kalasurmath, HCGP for the Respondent.

Facts of the Case

The assessee, a company, was involved in the acquisition of land under the provisions of the Karnataka Highways Act, 1964. The Assessing Officer (AO) contended that the compensation received by the assessee would be subject to tax as per the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act.

The matter reached the Karnataka High Court.

High Court Held

The Karnataka High Court held that the exemption from income tax under Section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, applies only to the awards or agreements made under the provisions of the said Act. The exemption is not applicable to compensation awarded for land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Highways Act, 1964.

The court held that the text of Section 96 is as clear as Gangetic Waters. It applies only to the awards or agreements made under the provisions of the said Act, which becomes apparent by the term ‘made under this Act’ consciously employed by the Parliament. To contend that even the awards passed under any other legislation would fit into the precincts of this provision is to render the said term otiose.

If the Parliament intended to exempt compensation from income tax, even when the acquisition is made, or awards are passed under “any law whichsoever”, it would have structured section 96 with a different text. After all, what income should be taxed and what should be exempted is a policy matter of Parliamentary wisdom.

The court also held that the argument that all persons who give up their lands in the statutory acquisition process, whichever be the enactment, would constitute one homogenous class and, therefore, section 96 of the 2013 Act should be read down as to include the awards made under other statutes as well, is too far-fetched an argument and therefore cannot be acceded to. Persons losing property in the acquisition under the 2013 Act constitute a class apart from those who do it under other statutes, at least for the purpose of claiming exemption from taxation.

List of Cases Reviewed

• KARUNANIDHI v. UOI (1979) 3 SCC 431 [para 4.1]
• ANIL AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2017) 3 KLJ 573 DB [para 4.1] followed.
• Order of Single Judge of High Court in WP No.103378 of 2017, WP No .103379 of 2017, WP No.103376 of 2017, WP No.103375 of 2017 and WP No.103377 of 2017, dated 12-4-2023 [para 4.9.9] set aside.

List of Cases Referred to

• other could not have been enacted. This view gains support from KARUNANIDHI v. UOI (1979) 3 SCC 431 (para 4.1)
• enactment would constitute one homogenous class vide NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. VITTAL RAO (1973) 1 SCC 500 (para 4.4)
• UNION OF INDIA v. TARSEM SINGH (2019) 9 SCC 304 (para 4.5)
• CIT v. Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009] 182 Taxman 368/315 ITR 1 (SC) (para 4.8)
• Bikram Singh v. Land Acquisition Collector [1996] 89 Taxman 119/[1997] 224 ITR 551 (SC) (para 4.9.3).

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Case Details: Income-tax Officer vs. Rajasthan Vikas Sansthan - [2024] 168 taxmann.com 157 (Jodhpur-Trib.)

Judiciary and Counsel Details

• Prashant Maharishi, Accountant Member & Yogesh Kumar U.S., Judicial Member
• P.C. Parwal, CA for the Appellant.
• O.P. Meena, CIT(DR) for the Respondent.

Facts of the Case

The assessee was registered as an educational trust under section 12AA. It entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with another trust for the provision of technical and financial assistance in the form of an interest-free loan.

The loan was granted for the development of infrastructure, which would be returned to the assessee after the development or 10 years, whichever was earlier.

The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that there was a common trustee in both the societies, and therefore there was a violation of provisions of section 13(3)(cc) and (e). Accordingly, he charged interest at the rate of 12% per annum and made the addition. On appeal, CIT(A) deleted the addition. The matter reached the Jodhpur Tribunal.

ITAT Held

The Tribunal held that the Delhi High Court in the case of Director of Income Tax (Exemption) v. Acme Educational Society [2010] 326 ITR 146 has held that where advances of temporary interest-free loans are given by one society to another society having similar objects and having the relative of the trustee as the trustee, it does not amount to an investment or deposit attracting the provisions of section 13(1)(d).

Therefore, so far as the issue of section 11(5) and section 13(1)(d) is concerned with respect to the investment with another trust and his wife being the trustee, the provisions of section 13(3)(e) are impacted. Section 13(3)(e) will apply only if there is the right to 20% of the profit of such concern.

As both the trusts are existing not for profit, even the provisions of section 13(3)(e) and 13(3)(cc) are not hit and, therefore, for this reason also it cannot be said that by giving the advance to that trust there is a direct or indirect benefit to the assessee trust.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee violated the provisions of the Income-tax Act when it gave an advance to another trust having the common object and also registered under section 12AA, even though they had common trustees.

List of Cases Reviewed

• Director of Income Tax (Exemption) v. Acme Educational Society 326 ITR 146 (para 21) followed.

List of Cases Referred to

• DIT v. Acme Educational Society [2010] 326 ITR 146 (Delhi) (para 20)
• DIT v. Alarippu [2000] 111 Taxman 511/244 ITR 358 (Delhi) (para 20).

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Case Details: Mange Ram Mittal vs. Commissioner of Income-tax - [2024] 168 taxmann.com 306 (Punjab & Haryana)

Judiciary and Counsel Details

• Sanjeev Prakash Sharma & Sanjay Vashisth, JJ.
• Akshay Bhan, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Bansal, Dr. Deepak Jindal & Yugank Goyal, Advs. for the Appellant.
• Sanjay Bansal, Sr. Adv. & Ms Gauri Neo Rampal, Senior Standing counsel for the Respondent.

Facts of the Case

A search was conducted at the assessee’s residential premises, and certain incriminating materials were found with respect to the liquor business. After making elaborate enquiries, the Assessing Officer (AO) concluded that the assessee owned a liquor business and accordingly passed an assessment order determining the undisclosed of the assessee based on the seized document.

On appeal, the Tribunal held that ample evidence, including partnership deeds of various liquor firms, was found in the course of the search itself regarding the assessee’s undisclosed income from the liquor business he carried on. Thus, it could not be said that the assessment of undisclosed income in that regard was outside the purview of section 158BC.

Aggrieved by the order, an appeal was filed to the Punjab & Haryana High Court.

High Court Held

The High Court held that the Parliament had enacted a separate Chapter-XIV-B of the Act laying down the special procedure for assessing search cases, a self-contained code. The amount to be taxed under the said chapter should have a direct nexus with the material discovered during such search operations alone. The assessment should be restricted only to the evidence found during the search. The words are relatable to such evidence, added with retrospective effect to Section 158BB from 01-07-1995, and re-enforced with the legal position that was not relatable to the evidence found as a result of search ought not to be included in the computation of undisclosed income. The Tribunal has, therefore, examined the meaning and scope of phraseology

“such other materials or information as are available with the Assessing Officer and relatable to such evidence”.

The words that have been added are rightly interpreted by the Tribunal to include two types of material that the AO may consider. First, the material found during the search and relatable to such evidence and the second part is such other materials or information as are available with the AO. Thus, apart from the evidence that may be collected and noticed during the search, if the AO has any other information and such other material with him that is relatable to such evidence, the same can also be looked into for the purpose.

Therefore, an assessment under section 158BC is required to be made both on the basis of the result of the search as well as post-search enquiry and other proceedings which are in the nature of consequences of the evidence found as a result of the search.

List of Cases Reviewed

• Order of ITAT in Mange Ram Mittal v. ACIT [2006] 103 ITD 389 (Delhi) (SB)/[2006] 9 SOT 371 (Delhi) [para 10] affirmed.

List of Cases Referred to

• Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. CIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 400/378 ITR 640 (SC) (para 14).

The post AO Can Consider Info Relatable to Evidence Found During Search for Making Block Assessment | HC appeared first on Taxmann Blog.

Case Details: Paramjit Singh vs. Ms Gagan Singh @ Mannu - [2024] 168 taxmann.com 140 (Delhi)

Judiciary and Counsel Details

• Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, J.
• P.S. Bindra, Sr. Adv., Asutosh Lohia, Rohit Saraswat, Gaurav Anand, Sharan Mehta & Karan Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
• Rakesh Munjal, Sr. Adv., Rakesh Kumar, Sunil, Rajat Sharma & R.P.S. Rana, Advs. for the Respondent.

Facts of the Case

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a mandatory injunction in respect of the property (‘suit property’) in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendants from creating any third-party interest qua the suit property.

The plaintiff stated that defendant no. 1’s father, late R and the plaintiff’s father, late S, were first cousins and had common businesses all over the world. They invested jointly in several immovable properties across the country, and the suit property was also purchased from the joint funds accrued from the said businesses.

The plaintiff further stated that though the title deed of the suit property was standing in the exclusive name of late R, the father of defendant no. 1 herein; however, said property was purchased in the name of late R in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit and enjoyment of the family of late S.

He stated that the family of late S had remained in exclusive possession of the second floor along with the terrace and received a share in the rentals collected from the tenants of the ground floor and the first floor. The plaintiff claimed joint ownership of the suit property on the basis of averments that the plaintiff’s father paid a substantial contribution towards sale consideration. He claimed that the plaintiff’s claim of joint ownership was saved under proviso (ii) to section 2(9)(A)(ii).

High Court Held

The Delhi High Court held that the plaintiff has admitted that the title documents of the suit property record that late R is the absolute owner of the suit property. The plaintiff has failed to file or produce any document to substantiate his claim that any fiduciary relationship existed between late S and late R or that any part of the purchase consideration was provided by late S.

The claim of joint investments between late S and late R is a bald averment unsubstantiated by even a sliver of a document. The plaintiff has not filed any written deed evidencing any fiduciary relationship between late S and late R. The plaintiff has filed no documents to show that S and R were carrying on any business together and/or held joint funds and/or held any joint investments, which could have formed the corpus for purchasing the suit property.

In the absence of documents evidencing the existence of a fiduciary relationship and existence of corpus of funds made available by the plaintiff from his/her known sources to defendant, the plaintiff cannot invoke proviso (ii) of section 2(9)(A) and the claim of the plaintiff would be barred under section 4 of the Benami Act.

List of Cases Referred to

• Pankaja v. Yellappa (2004) 6 SCC 415 (para 5.7)

The post Benami Act Bars Claim of Ownership Without Documents Showing Fiduciary Property Purchase | HC appeared first on Taxmann Blog.

Meenakshi Subramaniam – [2024] 168 taxmann.com 285 (Article)

When the bank locker of famous film music director R.D.Burman was opened, everyone was stunned. There were just five rupees in it. Bank lockers throw up unexpected surprises. But, the income tax department was in for a real jolt as the Supreme Court in Hdfc Bank Ltd. v. State of Bihar [2024] 167 taxmann.com 600 allowed taxpayer to open bank locker despite a prohibitory order, saw nothing wrong in cooperation of bank officials and freed the bank manager from criminal charges.

[2024] 167 taxmann.com 600 (Supreme Court)
HDFC Bank Ltd.
v.
State of Bihar

On October, 2021, Smt. Priyanka Sharma, Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Unit-2(2), Respondent No. 5 in the present proceedings, conducted a search and seizure operation in the case of several income-tax assessees including Shri Sunil Khemka (HUF), Smt. Sunita Khemka and Smt. Shivani Khemka at the third floor of Khataruka Niwas, South Gandhi Maidan, Patna.

During the search it was found that Smt. Sunita Khemka held a bank locker bearing No. 462 in the appellant-bank at Exhibition Road, Patna. On the basis of the said operation, on 5th October, 2021, an order under Section 132(3) of the IT Act was served upon the Branch Manager of the appellant-bank by the concerned Authorized Officer, thereby directing the branch of the appellant-bank to stop the operation of any bank lockers, bank accounts and fixed deposits standing in the names of Shri Sunil Khemka (HUF), Smt. Sunita Khemka and Smt. Shivani Khemka, among several other individuals and entities, with immediate effect. It was further clarified that contravention of the order would render the Branch Manager liable under Section 275A of the IT Act and the same would result in penal action.

In compliance of the order, the appellant-bank stopped the operation of the bank accounts, bank lockers and fixed deposits of the individuals/entities mentioned in the order. Further, on 7th October, 2021, the appellant-bank blocked the bank accounts of the income-tax assesses named in the order and also sealed the bank locker bearing No. 462 belonging to Smt. Sunita Khemka.

Subsequently, on 1st November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued an order to the Branch Manager of the appellant- bank, thereby directing the appellant-bank to revoke the restraint put on the bank accounts of Smt. Sunita Khemka and three other persons, in view of the restraining order dated 5th October, 2021 passed under Section 132(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the said persons, including Smt. Sunita Khemka, were to be allowed to operate their bank accounts. The said order was received by the concerned Branch Manager of the appellant-bank of 8th November, 2021 at 4:00 p.m. However, on 2nd November, 2021 at 11:24 a.m., an email was sent to the Branch Manager which contained the same order.

Thereafter, on 9th November, 2021, the concerned branch of the appellant-bank allowed Smt. Sunita Khemka to operate her bank locker bearing No. 462 and proper entries recording the operation of the said locker were made in the bank’s records.

Subsequently, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 conducted a search and seizure operation at the bank locker in the concerned bank branch wherein it was found that Smt. Sunita Khemka had operated her bank locker with the assistance of the concerned officers of the appellant-bank. This was validated by the entry made in the bank’s records and the CCTV footage of the bank. Resultantly, the concerned officials of the appellant-bank were found to have breached the restraining order dated 5th October, 2021.

Accordingly, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued summons under Section 131(1A) of the IT Act to Abha Sinha-Branch Manager, Abhishek Kumar-Branch Operation Manager and Deepak Kumar-Teller Authoriser being the concerned officials of the appellant-bank.

These officials attended the office of Respondent No. 5 and their statements were recorded wherein Abha Sinha and Abhishek Kumar stated that there had been an inadvertent error on the part of the bank officials and they had misinterpreted the order dated 1st November, 2021. Since the said order pertained to the bank accounts of the concerned individuals including Smt. Sunita Khemka, the bank officials had misread the order to understand/assume that the revocation of the restraint extended to the bank lockers as well. Having misunderstood the order, the bank officials under a bona fide assumption that bank locker had been released as well, allowed Smt. Sunita Khemka to operate the same.

The statement of Smt. Sunita Khemka had also been recorded wherein she stated that her accountant Surendra Prasad, after speaking with Deepak Kumar, had informed her that the restraint on the bank locker had been revoked and she could operate the said locker. This was specifically denied by Deepak Kumar in his statement.

Dissatisfied with said explanations, Respondent No. 5 submitted a written complaint to the SHO, Gandhi Maidan Police Station seeking to register an FIR against Smt. Sunita Khemka and the concerned bank officials on the ground that the order dated 5th October, 2021 had been violated owing to the unlawful operation of the locker.

On the basis of the said complaint, on 22nd November, 2021, an FIR being Case No. 549 of 2021 came to be registered against Smt. Sunita Khemka and the staff of the appellant-bank at branch for the offences punishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 207, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the IPC at the police station.

Aggrieved, the appellant-bank preferred a Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case thereby invoking the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the quashing of the FIR. The High Court dismissed the writ petition finding it to be devoid of merit.

This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 8th June, 2022 passed by the learned Single Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

Click Here To Read The Full Article

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Notification No. 118/2024, dated 12-11-2024

Section 10 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides an exclusive list of income which does not form part of the total income of the assessee. Clause 46A of section 10 relates to the exemption with respect to income arising to the notified body, authority, board, trust, or commission, not being a company if such person:

• Has been established or constituted by or under a Central Act, or State Act with one or more of the following purposes:

1. 1. dealing with and satisfying the need for housing accommodation;
   2. planning, development, or improvement of cities, towns and villages;
   3. regulating, or regulating and developing, any activity for the benefit of the general public; or
   4. regulating any matter, for the benefit of general public, arising out of the object for which it has been created; and

• Is notified by the Central Government.

In this respect, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has notified the “Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board” for the purposes of section 10(46A). This notification shall be effective from the assessment year 2024-25.

Click Here To Read The Full Notification

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